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Abstract
Heterogeneity in Nash networks with two-way ﬂow can arise due to diﬀerences in the follow-
ing four variables: (i) the value of information held by players, (ii) the rate at which information
decays as it traverses the network, (iii) the probability with which a link transmits information,
and (iv) the cost of forming a link. Observe that the second and third forms of heterogeneity
are also instances of link imperfections. In sharp contrast to the homogeneous cases in this
paper we show that for any type of link imperfection, under heterogeneity involving only two
degrees of freedom, all networks can be supported as Nash or eﬃcient. To address the question
of conﬂict between stability and eﬃciency, we then identify conditions under which eﬃcient
networks are also Nash. We also ﬁnd that cost heterogeneity leads to non-existence of Nash
networks in models with and without link imperfections. We show that in general there is
no relationship between the decay and probabilistic models of network formation. Finally, we
show that on reducing heterogeneity the earlier “anything goes” result disappears.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D85.
Key Words: Strategic reliability, decay, two-way ﬂow models
11 Introduction
“The predicted equilibrium networks are often quite stark in nature (stars, complete networks,
interlinked stars, etc.). This is partly due to the fact that most of the models that have been
solved have strong symmetries in the assumed payoﬀ functions. Without any natural hetero-
geneity in the problem, it is not surprising that very simple network structures emerge as
predictions.” – Jackson (2006, [8]). This remarkably accurate observation about strategic
models of network formation implies that such models have limited applicability. In this pa-
per we introduce heterogeneity and link imperfections in game-theoretic models of network
formation to address the above mentioned problem while also creating a richer set of models.
Incorporating heterogeneity in network models leads to formulations that are realistic,
and therefore are also able to explain reality better. Since results about strict Nash (and
eﬃcient) networks are directly linked to the value of parameters, heterogeneity yields a richer
set of results. Moreover, it acts as a robustness check for the Nash equilibrium and eﬃciency
results obtained using homogeneous parameters besides having signiﬁcant implications for the
existence of Nash equilibria. As for link imperfections, they provide an additional degree of
realism to models of Nash networks. They can be used to capture the idea that links may fail
to transmit information (probabilistic models of network formation) or may transmit only a
part of the information (decay models of network formation).1
The notion of Nash networks was introduced by Bala and Goyal in two papers (2000, [1],
[2]).2 In their ﬁrst paper (2000, [1]), links in the network never fail, and always transmit all
information reliably. Given that link formation is costly, the authors ﬁnd that Nash networks
are always minimally connected. The paper also introduces link imperfection in the form
of information decay whereby direct links convey more information than indirect links. In
their second paper (2000, [2]), another form of link imperfection is introduced. Each link is
allowed to fail with some probability p. Although link formation is still a costly act, in this
1When making a telephone call for instance, one may not always be able to reach the other person or when the
other person can be successfully contacted, they may choose not to reveal all the information.
2In the following, we use Nash networks to refer to networks that satisfy Nash equilibrium as the stability concept
instead of Jackson and Wolinsky’s (1996, [9]) notion of pairwise stability.
2case as opposed to perfectly reliable links they ﬁnd that as the amount of information at stake
increases, players attempt to insure themselves against link failure by forming super-connected
networks, i.e, networks where links have back-ups. A key feature of both papers is that all
utilized parameters are homogeneous.
In a recent paper in Games and Economic Behavior, Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst
(2006, [5]) examine heterogeneity in Nash networks without taking any link imperfections into
account. Their results are similar in spirit to those of Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]) in the sense
that equilibrium networks now have components that are minimally connected. Heterogeneity
in the presence of link imperfections has been analyzed by Haller and Sarangi (2005, [7]) who
ﬁnd that the homogeneity of the parameters plays a signiﬁcant role in the two widely divergent
results of Bala and Goyal (2000, [1], [2]). Haller and Sarangi (2005, [7]) allow diﬀerent links
to have diﬀerent success probabilities and ﬁnd that for any network g, there exists a set of
parameter values under which g is Nash – the model with heterogeneity can encompass the
results of both Bala and Goyal papers.
In this paper we examine diﬀerent possible heterogeneous Nash network formulations using
the popular “connections model” introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, [9]) and studied
extensively by Bala and Goyal (2000, [1], [2]). In the typical model players are endowed
with some information which can be accessed by other players forming links with them. Link
formation is costly, and the cost of establishing a link is incurred by the initiating player. In this
model heterogeneity manifests itself in the payoﬀ function and can occur through four diﬀerent
variables: (i) the value of information held by players, (ii) the rate at which information decays
or loses value as it traverses the network, (iii) the probability with which a link transmits
information, and (iv) the cost of forming a link. Thus by introducing heterogeneity and link
imperfections in this manner we are able to generalize the results of Bala and Goyal (2000, [1],
[2]) where heterogeneity is not taken into consideration, and Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst
(2006, [5]) where link imperfections are not present.
We focus on the two-way ﬂow models introduced by Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]).3 The
3For the impact of heterogeneity on Nash and eﬃcient networks in one-way ﬂow models, see Galeotti (2006, [4]).
For existence issues in such models we refer the reader to Billand, Bravard and Sarangi (2007, [3]).
3two-way ﬂow model allows bi-directional ﬂow of information through a link regardless of who
establishes it. Here we examine Nash networks, eﬃcient networks and the existence of strict
Nash networks under diﬀerent possible heterogeneous frameworks arising from combinations
of the above variables. Our main results can be summarized as follows:
• cost heterogeneity aﬀects the existence of Nash networks with or without link imperfec-
tions, and
• under heterogeneity and link imperfections it is possible to support any network as a
strict Nash or eﬃcient network.
Cost heterogeneity leads to non-existence because it provides opportunities for link substitu-
tion. This leads to cyclical behavior since agents keep switching links. Moreover, in order
to support any network as a strict Nash network or eﬃcient network, we ﬁnd that only two
degrees of freedom are needed. Thus having two sets of values is suﬃcient for the “anything
goes” result. We also identify conditions under which eﬃcient networks are simultaneously
Nash. Finally, we show that there is no obvious relationship between the probabilistic models
of network formation and those allowing for decay.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model setup. Section 3
contains results about models with imperfect reliability and heterogeneity. In Section 4, we
study models that incorporate heterogeneity and decay. In Section 5 we discuss the relationship
between these two types of model. Section 6 provides a discussion of our results and a summary
of the existing work on two-way ﬂow models.
2 Model Setup
In this section we deﬁne the formal elements of the strategic form network formation game.
Let N = {1,...,n}, n ≥ 3, denote the set of with generic elements i,j,k. For ordered pairs
(i,j) ∈ N × N, the shorthand notation i j is used and for non-ordered pairs {i,j} ⊂ N the
shorthand [i j] is used.
Strategies. For player i a pure strategy is a vector gi = (gi,1,...,gi,i−1,gi,i+1, ...,gi,n)
∈ {0,1}N\{i}. Since our aim is to model network formation, gi,j = 1 implies that there exists a
4direct link between i and j initiated by player i, whereas gi,j = 0 means that i does not initiate
this link. Regardless of what player i does, player j can always choose to initiate a link with i
or set gj,i = 0. We focus only on pure strategies. The set of all pure strategies of player i is de-
noted by Gi and consists of 2n−1 elements. The joint strategy space is given by G = G1×   ×Gn.
Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between G and the set of all directed graphs
or networks with vertex set N. Namely, to a strategy proﬁle g = (g1,...,gn) ∈ G corresponds
the graph (N,E(g)) with edge set E(g) = {(i,j) ∈ N × N| i  = j, gi,j = 1}. In the sequel, we
identify a joint strategy g by its corresponding graph and use the terminology directed graph
or directed network g for it.
Payoﬀs. Payoﬀs of player i are given by the diﬀerence between beneﬁts Bi(g) and costs
ci(g). Hence the payoﬀ of player i in network g is given by
ui(g) = Bi(g) − ci(g). (1)
Next we deﬁne various types of heterogeneity in networks by introducing diﬀerent cost and
beneﬁt formulations.
2.1 Link Costs
Players incur costs only for the direct links they establish. We consider two possible kinds of
costs.
1. Homogeneous costs. Each player i incurs a cost c > 0 when she initiates the direct link
i j, i.e., if gi,j = 1. Hence the total costs incurred by player i when network g is formed
are given by:




2. Heterogeneous costs. The cost of each link now depends on the speciﬁc pair of players




gi,j   ci,j. (3)
52.2 Link Beneﬁts
In any given network, beneﬁts depend on values possessed by players, the reliability of links
and the nature of information decay in the model. Note that reliability and decay models
are treated as mutually exclusive scenarios in the networks literature and here we retain this
distinction. In a model with perfect reliability and no decay, a player obtains the full value
of information from all the players she “observes” both through her direct and indirect links.4
In a model with imperfect reliability, information obtained from a player through direct or
indirect links has the same value, but links may fail to transmit information with a certain
probability. To compute the value of information i acquires from j, it is now necessary to
take into account all possible pathways that link i with j. This captures the idea that when
one channel of communication fails to deliver the information it may be obtainable through
another path. In decay models however, links always transmit the information, but information
acquired through indirect links is less valuable. Since information loses value as it travels along
a sequence of links it captures the idea that “it is better to have the facts straight from the
horse’s mouth”. In this scenario, instead of considering all possible paths between two players
we only consider the path that involves the least possible information decay.
2.2.1 Beneﬁts with Perfectly Reliable Links and No Decay
In such a model, a link between players i and j allows for two-way ﬂow of information. So
the beneﬁts from network g are derived from its closure g ∈ G, deﬁned by gi,j = max {gi,j,gj,i}
for i  = j. Moreover, since information is acquired through direct and indirect links we say
information ﬂows from player j to player i, when i and j are linked by means of a path in g.
A path of length m in g ∈ G from player i to player j  = i, is a ﬁnite sequence i0,i1,...,im of
pairwise distinct players such that i0 = i, im = j, and gik,ik+1 = 1 for k = 0,...,m − 1. Let
Ci,j(g) be the set of paths from j to i in the network g, and let Ci,j(g) be a typical element of
4We say a player observes another player directly if the geodesic distance between them is one, and observes her
indirectly if the geodesic distance betwen them exceeds one.
6Ci,j(g). We denote by
Ni(g) = {j ∈ N| j  = i, there exists a path in g between i and j},
the set of other players whom i can access or “observe” in network g. Information received





Substituting this in (1) and using diﬀerent cost formulations we obtain a class of models
developed by Galeotti, Goyal, and Kamphorst (2006, [5]). Assuming homogeneous values and
costs reduces this to one of the models examined in Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]).
Note that g belongs to the set H = {h ∈ G|hi,j = hj,i for i  = j}. There is a one-to-one
correspondence between the elements of H and the non-directed networks with node set N.
Namely, for h ∈ H and i  = j, [i j] is an edge of the corresponding non-directed network if
and only if hi,j = hj,i = 1. In what follows, we identify h with the corresponding non-directed
network. Hence, the notation [i j] ∈ h stands for “[i j] is an edge of h”. Also, for k ∈ H,
k ⊂ h means that k is a subnetwork of h.
2.2.2 Beneﬁts with Imperfectly Reliable Links
In such a model heterogeneity in beneﬁts from links depends on the value parameter Vi,j > 0,
and the probability of link success, pi,j > 0. The closure of the network g determines the
possible ﬂow of information in this setting. If gi,j = 0, then there is no (direct) information
ﬂow between i and j. If gi,j = 1, then the link succeeds (there is direct two-way information
ﬂow between i and j) with probability pi,j ∈ (0,1) and fails (there is no direct information ﬂow
between i and j) with probability 1 − pi,j. Of course it is also possible that all links have the
same success probability p > 0. Further it is assumed that success probabilities across links
are independent events.
Observe that the joint strategy g gives rise to a random network with possibly diﬀerent
realization probabilities for diﬀerent edges. These possible realizations of the random net-
7work consist of the non-directed networks h satisfying h ⊂ g. Invoking the independence
assumption, given g, the probability of the network h ⊂ g being realized is:




[i j]∈¯ g\h(1 − pi,j). (5)
Note that this conditional probability can be deﬁned similarly when all links have the same




h⊂g λ(h | g)bi(h). (6)
A realization of the network h, which occurs with probability λ(h | g), gives player i beneﬁts
bi(h). Summing over all possible realizations h ⊂ g yields expected beneﬁts. Variations of
the expected beneﬁts formulation can be substituted in the payoﬀ function to obtain diﬀerent
models.
The model of imperfect reliability where all values, costs and probabilities are identical
across players and links was analyzed by Bala and Goyal (2000, [2]). We call this the model
of imperfect reliability with homogeneous parameters. The payoﬀ function where the
link failure probability is diﬀerent for each link but V and c are identical across all players
is called the model of imperfect reliability with heterogeneous links. Such a model
was ﬁrst analyzed by Haller and Sarangi (2005). In this paper, we introduce a model with
identical link failure probabilities, but with values Vi,j. We call this the model of imperfect
reliability with heterogeneous players. Our paper also permits heterogeneity in link
formation costs.
2.2.3 Beneﬁts with Decay of Value through Links
Decay models were introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, [9]) under the name of the
“connections model”. In the Nash networks setting they were analyzed by Bala and Goyal
(2000, [1]) who assumed that the value of information, the costs of link formation, and the
decay parameter were identical across all players and links. In other words, they analyzed the
case of homogeneous decay. We propose two diﬀerent frameworks to capture heterogeneity in
models with decay.
8Decay with Heterogeneous Players. Here we utilize the homogeneous decay assump-
tion in conjunction with the heterogeneous players framework of Galeotti, Goyal and Kam-
phorst (2006, [5]), i.e., we assume that there exists (i,j)  = (k,ℓ) such that Vi,j  = Vk,ℓ. Then







ci,j   gi,j, (7)
where δ is the decay parameter and di,j(g) is the distance in the shortest path between i and
j in g.5 We use this label for the model regardless of whether link costs are homogeneous or
heterogeneous.
Decay with Heterogeneous Links. Here we assume that decay associated with the link
[i j] is not identical to decay associated with the link [ℓ k] for [ℓ k]  = [i j]. This assumption
captures the fact that under decay the quantity of information a link can convey is not the
same across all links. In other words, some links or paths are “better” than others.
We measure decay associated with a link [i j] by the parameter δi,j ∈ (0,1). Given a
network g, it is assumed that if player i has a link with player j, then she receives information
of value δi,j from j. For this model we retain the symmetry assumption, that is δi,j = δj,i.
Without loss of generality we assume that the value of a link is V = 1. The payoﬀ of player i





















This expression fundamentally diﬀers from the previous one because it does not use the
geodesic distance between players to determine the value of information obtained. We use this
label for the model regardless of whether link costs are homogeneous or heterogeneous.
2.3 Network Deﬁnitions
Nash Networks. Given a network g ∈ G, let g−i denote the network that remains when all
of player i’s links have been removed. Clearly, g = gi⊕g−i, where the symbol ⊕ indicates that
5In Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]), it is assumed that players can always access their own information.
9g is composed of the union of links in gi and g−i (similarly the symbol ⊖ is used to indicate
removal of a link). A strategy gi is a best response of player i to g−i if
ui(gi ⊕ g−i) ≥ ui(g′
i ⊕ g−i), for all g′
i ∈ Gi.
Let BRi(g−i) denote the set of player i’s best responses to g−i. A network g = (g1,...,gn)
is said to be a Nash network if gi ∈ BRi(g−i) for each i ∈ N. A strict Nash network is a
network where all players are playing a strict best response.
Eﬃcient Networks. A network g is eﬃcient if the total utility of players is maximum,




i=1 ui(g′), for all g′ ∈ G.
Graph-theoretic Concepts. A network g is called a star if there is a vertex is, such
that for all j  = is, max{gis,j,gj,is} = 1 and for all k  ∈ {is,j}, max{gk,j,gj,k} = 0. Moreover a
star, where gis,j = 1 for all j  = is is a center-sponsored star, and a star, where gis,j = 0 for all
j  = is, is a periphery-sponsored star. Finally, a star which is neither a center-sponsored star
nor a periphery-sponsored star is a mixed star. A network g is connected if there is a path
in g between all players i,j ∈ N. A network g is minimally connected if it is connected
and for all i j ∈ E(g), g ⊖i,j is unconnected. A network g is superconnected if there exists
a link i j ∈ E(g) such that g ⊖ i,j is still a connected network.
Finally, a network g ∈ G is essential if gi,j = 1 implies gj,i = 0. Note that if g ∈ G is a
Nash network, then it must be essential. This follows from the fact that each link is costly
while information ﬂow is two-way and independent of which player invests in forming the link.
3 Models with Imperfect Reliability
Imperfect reliability is a link imperfection where links fail to transmit information with a
positive probability. Based on the parameters three formulations of network reliability are
possible. First, is the model of Bala and Goyal (2000, [2]) which is homogeneous with respect
to all parameters (the pV model). This was followed by the work of Haller and Sarangi (2005,
[7]) who allow for heterogeneity in link failure probabilities (the pi,jV model). A third kind
of heterogeneity involves players with diﬀerent values of information. We call this model of
imperfect reliability as the model with heterogeneous players (the pVi,j model) and analyze it
10next.
We begin by illustrating that Nash equilibrium under the heterogeneous players model need not
coincide with Nash equilibrium under the heterogeneous links model. To allow for meaningful
comparison we impose the restriction that the expected value of a direct link is the same under
both formulations, i.e., pVi,j = pi,jV , for all (i,j) ∈ N × N.

















































It is easy to check that pVi,j = pi,jV , for all i,j ∈ N. Straightforward calculations show
that the network g with E(g) = {1 3,3 2,2 1} is a Nash network in the pVi,j framework. But,
in the pi,jV framework the diﬀerence between the expected utility of player 3 in g and g′ with
E(g′) = {1 3,2 1} is −1/15 < 0. Hence g is not a Nash network. Furthermore, it is easy to
check that g′ is a Nash network for the pi,jV game.
The intuition behind this diverging result is the following. Since we have pi,jV = pVi,j,
the higher pi,j is, the higher is Vi,j (for given V and p respectively). In the pVi,j framework,
higher values provide an incentive to form links, while in pi,jV framework, higher probabilities
reduce the marginal beneﬁts of alternative paths. Thus player 3 is better oﬀ not forming the
link 32.
We present two results for this model. First, instead of explicitly characterizing all the
Nash equilibria, for the sake of brevity, we demonstrate that there exist conditions such that
every essential network can be strict Nash. This is also shown to be true for eﬃcient networks.
11Theorem 1 : (Imperfect reliability with heterogeneous players.) Let g be an essential network.
Then, there exists a homogeneous link cost c > 0, a probability p, and an array V = [Vi,j] of
values such that
1. g is a strict Nash network in the corresponding network formation game;
2. g is an eﬃcient network in the corresponding network formation game.
Proof Let g be an essential network.
1. First, we prove that there is a link cost c > 0, a probability p, and an array V of values
such that g is a strict Nash network. We assume that Vi,j ∈ {ε,V }. More precisely, if
gi,j = 1, then Vi,j = V , and if gi,j = 0, then Vi,j = ε < V .
Let g ⊕i,j with Vi,j = ε, be the network where i obtains the largest amount of resources









Z for each ℓ ∈ {2,...,n(n − 1)/2}. It is possible that some aℓ or some a′
ℓ
are null. Let A =
 n(n−1)/2
ℓ=2 (|aℓ| + |a′
ℓ|).
Let g⊖i,j be the network where i obtains the resources of j with the largest probability,
with Vi,j = V , given that there is no link between i and j in this network. Then, the









Given A and B, there exists p such that
p <
V − ε
V (A + B)
, A  = 0 or B  = 0,
and
pε + p2AV < c < V p − Bp2V.
12Now, it is clear that a player i who did not form a link with j in g has no incentive to
form this link. Indeed, if i forms a link with j, then her payoﬀ function increases by
an amount which is bounded above by pε + p2AV − c < 0. Likewise, a player i has an
incentive to preserve her link with player j if gi,j = 1. Indeed, a player j brings to i an
amount which is bounded below by V p − Bp2V − c > 0. It follows that all players play
a best response in g. Hence g is a strict Nash network.
2. Second, we prove that there is a link cost c > 0, a probability p, and an array V of
values such that g is an eﬃcient network. Again for gi,j = 1, Vi,j = V , and if gi,j = 0,
thenVi,j = ε < V/2n. Let F = {i j|gi,j = gj,i = 0} be the set of links such that
Vi,j = ε and D ⊂ F. Let g′(D) = argmaxg′∈G{W(g′ ⊕ D) − W(g′)} be the network
where the n players obtain the largest amount of resources thanks to the links in D. Let
D∗ = argmaxD⊂F{g′(D)} be the subset of F which brings the maximal increasing total








Z for each ℓ ∈ {1,...,n(n − 1)/2}. It is possible that some eℓ or some e′
ℓ
are null. Let E =
 n(n−1)/2
ℓ=2 (|eℓ| + |e′
ℓ|).




, E  = 0 or B  = 0,
and
2npε + p2EV < c < V p − Bp2V.
Then, by using arguments similar to those in the previous part, we conclude that g is an
eﬃcient network.
￿
Corollary 1 Let g be an essential network. Then, there exists a homogeneous link cost c > 0,
a probability p, and an array V = [Vi,j] of values such that g is a strict Nash network and an
eﬃcient network.
13Proof It is suﬃcient to inspect the bounds for eﬃcient and strict Nash networks given in the
proof of Theorem 1 to establish the corollary. ￿
A few remarks are in order here. First, although Haller and Sarangi (2005, [7]) do not
investigate this issue, it can be easily shown that a similar eﬃciency result holds for the
heterogeneous links model.
Second, for any network to be Nash, it is enough to introduce two degrees of value hetero-
geneity. Indeed, in the proof of Theorem 1 we only need two diﬀerent values. Further, even if
the diﬀerence between these two values is small we can always ﬁnd parameters p and c such
that the network is Nash.
Third, Theorem 1 still holds if there is heterogeneity in link costs as well. A simple
continuity argument can be used to verify this.
Next it is also worth asking what is the relationship between eﬃciency and stability in this
model. Both Bala and Goyal (2000, [2]), and Haller and Sarangi (2005, [7]) claim that when
costs are very high or very low, there is no conﬂict between stability and eﬃciency. We ﬁnd
that the same is true for the heterogeneous players model. It is possible to use a continuity
argument to preserve the result of Bala and Goyal (2000, [2], pp. 223-224) concerning the
conﬂict between Nash networks and eﬃcient networks.
Finally, one can ask the question: Given Theorem 1, is there any role for explicit character-
ization of the strict Nash networks? Although for the sake of brevity we do not pursue this,
it can still be a meaningful exercise since the framework allows for the existence of multiple
equilibria. Consider for instance Example 1 in Bala and Goyal (2000, [2]). This is the simplest
possible imperfect reliability scenario since it only has 3 players with homogeneous values,
costs and reliability. First, there exists a parameter range in which periphery-sponsored stars
are Nash. Clearly, as there is no rule for selecting the central player, the coordination problem
for selecting this player may still persist under heterogeneity. Moreover, the authors identify
a parameter range where two kinds of architectures are Nash: the center-sponsored star and
mixed stars. Such an outcome is possible even with parameter heterogeneity.
14We now identify suﬃcient conditions for the simultaneous existence of two types of star
networks in equilibrium in the heterogeneous players framework. Let V m = max(i,j)∈N×N{Vi,j}
and V m = min(i,j)∈N×N{Vi,j}.
Proposition 1 : Consider the heterogeneous players model with homogeneous costs. If pV m >
c and (n − 2)(1 − p2)V m + (1 − p)V m < c, then center-sponsored stars and mixed stars are
strict Nash networks.
Proof The proof by contradiction is an adaptation of the proof of Bala and Goyal (2000,
[2]). Let is ∈ N be the center of the star. We focus on center-sponsored stars. Suppose that
there is a player j who is not linked with is (gj,is = gis,j = 0). Then the marginal payoﬀ that
is obtains from a player j is pVis,j ≥ pV m > c, a contradiction. Moreover, if player j forms
k ≥ 1 links, then her payoﬀ is bounded above by
 
i∈N\{j}
Vj,i − kc. (11)
The payoﬀ that player j obtains in the center-sponsored star is:
pVj,is + p2  
i∈N\{j,is}
Vj,i. (12)
Subtracting (12) from (11) shows that j’s maximum incremental payoﬀ from one or more links
is no larger than (n − 2)(1 − p2)V m + (1 − p)V m − c, which is negative by choice of p and c.
Hence, j’s best response is to form no link with a player i  = is. The proof for the mixed stars
can be made with similar arguments. ￿
Existence of Nash networks. We show that there exist parameters p, c, (Vi,j)(i,j)∈N×N\{i},
such that there is no Nash network in the pVi,j framework. Note that this result is preserved
when the costs of link formation are heterogeneous.
Example 2 : (Non-existence of Nash networks.) Let N = {1,2,3} be the set of players. Let





p(1−p)(pV1,2+(1+p)V1,3) < c, p(1−p)(pV2,1+(1+p)V2,3) < c, p(1−p)(pV3,1+(1+p)V3,2,) > c.
1. The empty network is not a Nash network, since pV1,3 > c.
152. A network with one link cannot be a Nash network. Indeed, if this link is the link
i j  = 1 3, then player i can obtain a higher payoﬀ by deleting this link, since pVi,j < c
. If this link is the link i j = 1 3, then player 2 has a higher payoﬀ if she forms the link
2 1, since pV2,1 + p2V2,3 > c.
3. Next, a network g with two links cannot be a Nash network. Given that Nash networks
must be essential in such a network, there always exists a path in g between the players.
i. SincepVi,j < c for all links i j, except the link 1 3, no network where a link allows
access to resources of only one other player can be Nash (except for the link 1 3).
From this it follows that only networks with links {1 3,2 3}, {1 2,3 2}, {2 1,3 1} or
{1 3,2 1} can be Nash.
ii. We know that player 2 prefers the link 2 1 to the link 2 3 (since pV2,1 + p2V2,3 >
p2V2,1 + pV2,3). Thus, networks with links 1 3, 2 3, cannot be Nash.
iii. We know that, every thing else being equal, player 1 prefers the link 1 3 to the link
1 2 (since pV1,3 > c > pV1,2). Thus, network with links 1 2 and 3 2 cannot be Nash.
iv. Since p(1−p)(pV3,1+(1+p)V3,2) > c, the networks with links {2 1,3 1} or {1 3,2 1}
cannot be Nash. Indeed, in such a case, player 3 has an incentive to set a link with
player 2.
Hence, it follows that a network with two links cannot be a Nash network.
4. Finally, we show that a network g with three links cannot be a Nash network. Note that
in this network there always exists a path in g between the players. Since p(1−p)(pV1,2+
(1 + p)V1,3) < c and p(1 − p)(pV2,1 +(1 + p)V2,3) < c, then no network where player 1 or
player 2 have formed links can be a Nash network. It follows that no network with three
links can be a Nash network.
4 Models with Decay
In this section we focus on the second type of link imperfections – situations where the value
of information conveyed by links decreases with network distance. Bala and Goyal (2000,
16[1]) analyze such networks in a homogeneous setting. Their main emphasis was on identifying
conditions that allow some architectures (complete and empty networks, and stars) to be Nash
or eﬃcient stating that it is diﬃcult to provide a complete characterization of Nash or eﬃcient
networks. Here we analyze the consequences of heterogeneity.
4.1 Decay with Heterogeneous Agents
In this section we obtain two main results.6 First, we demonstrate that all networks can be
supported as strict Nash and eﬃcient. Next, we show that there exist parameter values for
which there is no Nash network in pure strategies.
Theorem 2 : (Decay with heterogeneous players.) Let g be an essential network. If the payoﬀ
function satisﬁes equation (7), then there exist a link cost c > 0 and an array V = [Vi,j] of
values such that:
1. g is a strict Nash network in the corresponding network formation game;
2. g is an eﬃcient network in the corresponding network formation game. Moreover this
network is also strict Nash.
Proof Let g be an essential network and V m = max(i,j)∈N×N{Vi,j}.
1. For gi,j = 1, let Vi,j(δ − δ2) > c, and if gi,j′ = 0, then let c > δVi,j′ + (n − 2)δ2V m,
with Vi,j > Vi,j′. These two conditions are compatible if δ is suﬃciently close to zero.
Under these restrictions no player has an incentive for unilateral deviation proving the
ﬁrst part.
2. For gi,j = 1, let Vi,j(δ−δ2) > c, and if gi,j′ = 0 , then let c > δ(Vi,j′+Vj′,i)+ δ2(n−2)nV m
(we assume gj′,i = 0). Again these two conditions are compatible if δ is suﬃciently close
to zero and gives us the desired eﬃcient network. Also, by inspecting the bounds chosen
for eﬃcient and strict Nash networks it is easy to see that g is also simultaneously a
strict Nash network.
6Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst (2006, [5]) consider the case of small levels of decay with heterogeneous players.
Their insider-outsider model only has two groups of players, and thus two possible values of δ.
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Existence of Nash networks. In this context we begin by showing that the model
of Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]), always has a Nash network. This result continues to hold if
heterogeneity is not “too high”, more precisely if Vi,j = Vi for all i ∈ N.
Theorem 3 : Suppose costs of forming links are homogeneous.
1. If the decay parameter and the values are homogeneous, then there always exists a Nash
network.
2. If the payoﬀ function satisﬁes equation (7) and, for all i ∈ N, Vi,j = Vi, for all j ∈ N\{i},
then a Nash network always exists.
Proof We now prove both parts of the theorem.
1. If δV ≤ c, then the empty network is a Nash network. If δV > c, then there are two
possibilities: (i) if (δ − δ2)V ≤ c, then star networks are Nash, and (ii) if (δ − δ2)V > c,
then the complete network is Nash.
2. If δVi ≤ c for all i ∈ N, then the empty network is a Nash network. If there exist
players i ∈ N such that δVi > c, then starting with the empty network let one of these
players, say i0, form link with all other players giving us a center-sponsored star. If for
all i ∈ N \ {i0}, (δ − δ2)Vi ≤ c, then the previous network is Nash. Otherwise, we let all
players i ∈ N \{i0} such that (δ −δ2)Vi > c be connected to all other players (obviously,
in that case we choose i0 such that (δ − δ2)Vi0 > c), and we obtain a Nash network.
￿
Notice that the above proof also identiﬁes conditions under which we can obtain some
simple architectures like stars as Nash networks. The following example shows that non-
existence can occur when we introduce higher player heterogeneity. Moreover, this example
can be modiﬁed to incorporate heterogeneity in link formation costs and still achieve the same
outcome.




δ − δ4 
+V1,3(δ2−δ3) > c, δV1,3 < δV1,2 < c, and for all j  = 2, δV1,j+δ2  




δ − δ4 
+ V2,4(δ2 − δ3) < c, δV2,3 + δ2V2,4 + δ3V2,5 + δ4V2,1 > c, and for all j  = 3,
δV2,j + δ2  
k =j V2,k < c.
3. δV3,4 > c and δ
 
k =4 V3,k + δ2V3,4 < c.
4. δV4,5 > c and δ
 
k =5 V4,k + δ2V4,5 < c.
5. δV5,1 > c and δ
 
k =1 V5,k + δ2V5,1 < c.
These ﬁve points provide a list of the players with whom the others have no incentives to form
links, as well as those with whom they would like to form links. For example, item 1 implies
that player 1 will never form a link with players 3, 4 and 5. Moreover, a Nash network must
contain the links 3 4, 4 5, 5 1. From all of this, it follows that there is four possible Nash
networks: E(g1) = (3 4,4 5,5 1,1 2,2 3), E(g2) = (3 4,4 5,5 1,1 2), E(g3) = (3 4,4 5,5 1),
E(g4) = (3 4,4 5,5 1,2 3). We know from item 2 that player 2 prefers the network g2 to the
network g1, so g1 is not Nash. Likewise, player 1 prefers the network g3 to the network g2 by
point 1, so g2 is not Nash. Player 2 prefers the network g4 to the network g3 by point 2, so
g3 is not Nash. Finally, by point 1, player 1 prefers the network g1 to the network g4. Hence
g4 is not Nash.
4.2 Decay with Heterogeneous Links
In this section we consider situations where players have homogeneous values while the decay
through each link is diﬀerent. We obtain the following result.
Theorem 4 : (Decay with heterogeneous links.) Let g be an essential network. If the payoﬀ
function satisﬁes equation (8) and costs of forming links are homogeneous, then there exist
c > 0 and an array δ = [δi,j] of decay such that:
1. g is a strict Nash network in the corresponding network formation game;
2. g is an eﬃcient network in the corresponding network formation game. Moreover this
network is also strict Nash.
19Proof
1. Let g be an essential network. For gi,j = 1, let c <
 
δi,j − (δm)2 
V , where δm =
max(i′,j′)∈N2{δi′,j′}. Also, for gi,j = 0, let c > (δi,j+δmδi,j(n−2))V . It can be veriﬁed that
these two conditions are compatible. Under these conditions a player i, who has a link
with a player j, has no incentive to remove it. Indeed, player i has the greatest incentive
to delete a link with j when she obtains the resources of j from a player k such that
max{gk,i,gi,k} = max{gk,j,gj,k} = 1. The condition which allows player i to maintain
her link with j is: c < (δi,j − δi,kδj,k)V which is always true if c <
 
δi,j − (δm)2 
V .
Likewise, a player i who does not have a link with a player j has no incentive to form this
link. Indeed, a player j can provide at most information of value (δi,j + δmδi,j(n − 2))V
to player i.
2. The proof of the second part of the proposition is similar to the previous part, but now
we assume that if gi,j = 0, then c > δi,j + δj,i + (δm)
2 (n − 2)nV (given that gj,i = 0).
Since the two conditions are again compatible, we can conclude that g is an eﬃcient
network. Finally, by inspecting the bounds for eﬃcient and strict Nash networks it is
easy to see that g is also simultaneously a strict Nash network.
￿
Next, in contrast to the connections model, if we assume that decay begins only with
indirect neighbors (instead of direct neighbors), then we can show that regardless of the value
of the parameters, some essential networks are neither Nash nor eﬃcient.
Example 4 Let N = {1,2,3} be the set of players, let g be a network such that E(g) = {1 2}.
Then, g is not a Nash network. Indeed, if player 1 has an incentive to form a link with player
2, then V < c. In that case, player 3 has an incentive to form a link with player 1. Likewise g
is not an eﬃcient network.
Existence of Nash equilibrium. The existence of Nash equilibria in the models with
decay and heterogeneous links remains an open question. However, if we add the heterogeneity
of costs to the heterogeneity of links, then it is possible to adapt an argument from Haller,
Kamphorst and Sarangi (2006, [6]) to show that Nash equilibria do not always exist. Indeed,
20they show in example 2 (pg.602) that there exist situations with no decay (δ = 1), homogeneous
values and heterogeneous costs, such that there does not exist any Nash network. Hence, by
continuity it is possible to construct a similar example with δ suﬃciently close to 1 where Nash
equilibria will not exist.
5 Comparing Probabilistic and Decay Models
In this section the two models of link imperfections are compared. Speciﬁcally, we focus on
two questions: Can strict Nash networks in one class of models tell us anything about strict
Nash networks in the other class of models? Further, what happens in probabilistic and decay
models if we reduce the extent of heterogeneity?
5.1 Relationship between Probabilistic and Decay Models
The probabilistic model uses all the paths between two players for computing payoﬀs while
the decay model only uses the shortest path between two players to determine payoﬀs. At ﬁrst
glance this suggests that decay models might be a subset of the probabilistic models. Hence
we ask if information about strict Nash networks in probabilistic models give some sense about
strict Nash networks in decay models. To address this question, we compare marginal payoﬀs
of links in both types of models.7 In order to make the models comparable we assume that
starting from the empty network, the marginal payoﬀs of a link is the same in both models,
that is we set δ = p.
We ﬁrst show that when the initial network is minimal, the marginal payoﬀ of a link is always
at least as great in the probabilistic model as in the decay model.
Indeed, suppose that in a minimal network g1, one player, say player i, forms a link with say
player j. Let the resulting network be denoted by g2. Either j is not observed by player i in
g1 and it is obvious that the marginal payoﬀ of the link i j is the same in both models, or j is
7Note that in the probabilistic model players’ marginal payoﬀs are expected marginal payoﬀs. However, for both
types of models, we use the term marginal payoﬀs to make reading easier. Moreover, we assume that players in the
probabilistic model are risk neutral.
21observed by i in g1. In the latter case, in the decay model, player i being at distance 1 from
player j in g2, she obtains an amount p of resources of player j. In the probabilistic model, i
accesses to the resources of j in g2 if the link i j works, that occurs with a probability p. She
also accesses the resources of j even when the link i j does not work. It is enough that all the
links which were contained in a path from j to i in g1 work. So, the amount of resources of
player j obtained by player i in g2 is greater than p. With the same type of reasoning, we can
show that the part of the resources of players k  = j, obtained by i in g2, is at least as great
in the probabilistic model as in the decay model. The result follows. From this result, it is
straightforward that a minimally connected Nash network in the probabilistic model is also a
Nash network in the decay model.
Next what happens if the initial network is not minimal? The example which follows shows
that the above result does not hold anymore.
Example 5 Let N = {1,2,3,4} be the set of players and let g1 be a network such that
E{g1} = (1 2,2 3,3 4,4 1).
Suppose that in g1 player 1 forms a link with player 3. We can check that for some p, for
instance p = 0.8, the marginal payoﬀ of this link is greater in the probabilistic model, whereas
the converse is true for some other p, for instance p = 0.9.
Recall that if the initial network is minimal, the marginal payoﬀ of a link is always as great
in the probabilistic model as in the decay model. This diﬀerence in the result can be explained
as follows.
Suppose that the initial network, denoted by g1, is not minimal. Then, there exist at least
two players in g1, say i and j, such that there are at least two paths between these two players.
Let player i form a link with player j in g1 and denote by g2 the resulting network. Although
the total payoﬀ of player i in g2 is greater in the probabilistic model than in the decay model,
this does not imply that the marginal payoﬀ of the link i j is greater in the probabilistic model
than in the decay model. Indeed, it is easy to check that, in g1, player i also gets a greater
payoﬀ in the probabilistic model than in the decay model.
When the initial network is not minimal, the diﬀerence in the marginal payoﬀ of a link i j
22depends on the architecture of the initial network (in particular the number of paths that exist
between player i and the other players from whom i obtains resources) and on the probability
that a link works. This makes it diﬃcult to ﬁnd a general rule which orders the marginal
payoﬀ of a link in both models. Thus, when the number of players is greater than 3 and the
initial network is not minimal, information about strict Nash networks in one type of models
does not provide any indication about strict Nash networks in the other type of models.
5.2 Consequences of Reducing Heterogeneity
Until now we have considered heterogeneity in values to be dependent on the pair of players.
This leads to an “anything goes” result in both types of models with link imperfections. Now
we ask what happens if heterogeneity in values is simply player dependent.8 In particular, if
Vi,j = Vi or Vi,j = Vj for all players i ∈ N. For instance, let N = {1,2,3} be the set of players,
Vi,j = Vi for all i ∈ N, and assume a network g where g1,2 = 1 and gi,j = 0 for all i,j  = 1,2.
It is obvious that either player 1 has an incentive to delete the link 1,2 or has an incentive
to form the link 1,3 under the probabilistic or decay models. Hence g can never be a Nash
network.
Next consider Vi,j = Vj for all i ∈ N, and assume a network g where g1,2 = 1 and gi,j = 0
for all i,j  = 1,2. Now either player 1 has an incentive to delete the link 1,2 or player 3 an
incentive to form the link 3,2. Again g can never be a Nash network under the probabilistic or
decay models. Thus we ﬁnd that on switching from link based heterogeneity to player based
heterogeneity the “anything goes” result does not hold anymore.
6 Discussion
We now sum up the main insights obtained from the introduction of heterogeneity. Addi-
tionally Table 1 provides an overview of results in two-way ﬂow models with and without
heterogeneity. The ﬁrst column here indicates the scope of strict Nash networks and the
second column does the same for eﬃcient networks.
8We are thankful to Matt Jackson for suggesting this.
23First, we ﬁnd that the introduction of heterogeneity allows for an “anything goes” result
in models with link imperfections. Not surprisingly, it holds for both strict Nash and eﬃcient
networks. This is shown to be true for both models with heterogeneous links as well as
heterogeneous players.
Second, the conditions which are presented to make any network eﬃcient are also suﬃcient
for them to be strict Nash. Thus we are able to identify conditions which simultaneously make
eﬃcient networks strict Nash addressing the important issue of conﬂict between stability and
eﬃciency.
Third, it is important to ask whether the richness of our strict Nash networks stems from
the degrees of freedom available in choosing model parameters made possible by heterogeneity.9
First, it is easy to verify that the introduction of heterogeneity in only one of the parameters
(values, costs, reliability, decay) dramatically increases the set of Nash networks. Secondly
however, a quick look at the results of Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst (2006, [5]) is enough to
show that having many degrees of freedom does not always lead to an “anything goes” result.
In fact as long as we have link imperfections we only need to impose minimal requirements in
term of the degrees of freedom. All our proofs only require two degrees of freedom in choosing
the value of the relevant parameters in models with heterogeneous links and heterogeneous
players.10 It is also important to bear in mind that cost heterogeneity is not required to
obtain this result. Thus one main insight that emerges from this paper is that the stark and
simplistic networks found in the diﬀerent homogeneous parameter formulations are very special
cases and not robust to the introduction of diﬀerent types of heterogeneity.
In Table 1 when going from a deterministic model with homogeneous parameters to a homo-
geneous probabilistic link failure model, Bala and Goyal (2000 [1], [2]) ﬁnd that Nash networks
change from being minimally connected to super-connected. More precisely, they ﬁnd that the
strict Nash networks change from being empty and center-sponsored stars to being empty and
connected networks. This is also true when we allow for decay with homogeneous parameters.
In the Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst (2006, [5]) formulation, that allows for heterogeneity
9See also Haller and Sarangi (2005, [7]) for a discussion of this.
10Moreover, the result holds as long as there is some diﬀerence between these two values.
24in values and costs in the deterministic framework, empty and minimal networks with center-
sponsored stars can be supported as Nash. Moreover, the authors show that only minimal
networks can be Nash. In contrast, heterogeneity in imperfect reliability models, whether it is
of the heterogeneous links type ` a la Haller and Sarangi (2005, [7]), or heterogeneous players
type as shown in this paper, always yields an “anything goes” result implying that any net-
work can be sustained as strict Nash by an appropriate set of parameters. We ﬁnd that the
same analysis holds when we introduce heterogeneity in models with decay. Moreover, Table 1
shows that a similar trend holds for eﬃciency. The key insight here is that when heterogeneity
requires players to take into account alternative paths between players instead of just aﬀecting
values and costs of link formation, then it is possible to obtain a richer set of networks.
Fourth, we ﬁnd that cost heterogeneity leads to non-existence of Nash equilibria both in
models with and without link imperfections. Additionally we ﬁnd that under value hetero-
geneity a Nash equilibrium always exists in these diﬀerent models. The underlying intuition is
the fact that cost heterogeneity creates link substitution possibilities which can lead to cyclical
behaviors.
The last column in Table 1 summarizes the results regarding existence of strict Nash
networks from diﬀerent models. Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]) show the existence of strict Nash
networks in the homogeneous deterministic framework through a constructive proof. Haller,
Kamphorst and Sarangi (2007, [6]) show that in the deterministic setting there always exists a
Nash network if costs of setting links are homogeneous and values of players are heterogeneous.
They also prove that this result does not hold if costs of forming links are heterogeneous.
Interestingly, with homogeneous link success probabilities under identical values and costs
(Bala and Goyal, 2000, [2]), the existence of strict Nash networks remains an open question.
However we believe that a strict Nash network will always exist in this instance. As can be
seen in the table with the introduction of heterogeneity of any type in imperfect reliability
models, it is possible to show that a strict Nash equilibrium does not exist for all parameters
values.
Next in the model of decay with homogeneous parameters we ﬁnd that strict Nash equilibrium
always exists. In the model with heterogeneous players we are able to show non-existence by
25means of an example, while in the model with heterogeneous links the existence of strict Nash
networks remains an open question. However, for both the unresolved existence problems in
Table 1, allowing costs heterogeneity is suﬃcient to show non-existence. This can be done by
adapting a proof from Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi (2007, [6], pg.602). Thus, as already
noted, we see that in models involving alternative paths, non-existence is likely. It follows
therefore that in models allowing for heterogeneity in costs of link formation we have to be
cautious about existence issues.
Fifth, we ﬁnd that on comparing the two diﬀerent types of models with link imperfections
it is not easy to make general statements. The most we can say is that a minimally connected
network that is a strict Nash network in the probabilistic model is also a strict Nash network
in the decay model. Finally, we also ﬁnd that making the heterogeneity player dependent is
suﬃcient to preclude the “anything goes” result regarding eﬃcient and strict Nash networks


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1: Two-way ﬂow models: Results.
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